Another way one can easily fail to attain full virtue is the lack of phronesis – moral or practical wisdom. A chess championship was recently held in London between defending champion Gary Kasparov and British challenger Nigel Short. The winner of the tournament received approximately $2 million in prizes. Imagine that one of the actors, say Kasparov, is „rational” in the economic sense, as evoked by the financial paradigm, while the other actor, Short, is „rational” in the sense of the Aristotelian practical rationality invoked by the theory of virtue-ethics. How exactly would these two individuals differ in their approach to the chess tournament? But are moral principles made of all ethics? Critics have rightly argued that this emphasis on moral principles smells of a thoughtless and servile cult of rules, as if the moral life were a matter of conscientiously revising our actions against a table of do`s and don`ts. Fortunately, this obsession with principles and rules has recently been challenged by several ethicists who argue that the emphasis on principles ignores a fundamental component of ethics – virtue. These ethicists point out that by focusing on what people should do or how people should act, the „moral principles approach” neglects the most important question – what people should be. In other words, the fundamental question of ethics is not „What should I do?” but „What kind of person should I be?” The role of role models is crucial for the application of virtue ethics, as virtues are prevalent by these individuals throughout the profession. Thus, in virtue ethics, ethics is something that is learned by observing the behavior of others. For example, Michael Pritchard concludes in his article on „Good Works” that „it is about discussing codes of ethics, the principles of good and evil, dilemmas.

and stories of moral catastrophes, we need stories of a different kind – stories of good professionals whose lives could inspire imitation” (p. 170, emphasis added). A resurgence of recognition of the critical importance of moral models is provided by cognitive science in its call for „theory of example.” Alvin Goldman summarizes the theory as follows: A virtue on a goal-centered account „is a willingness to respond or recognize elements in their field or areas in an excellent or sufficiently good manner” (Swanton 2003:19). A virtuous action is an action that responds to the purpose of a virtue, that is, it succeeds in reacting to the objects in its domain in the manner indicated (233). To provide a definition centered on the objectives of appropriate action, we must go beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the resulting actions. This is because a single action context can include a number of different overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to insist on accomplishing a difficult task, even if it requires uniformity of purpose. But loving my family might use my time and attention differently. To define right action, a goal-centered vision must explain how we deal with the conflicting demands of various virtues on our resources.

There are at least three different ways to meet this challenge. A perfectionist, goal-oriented narrative would declare, „An action is just if and only if it is virtuous overall, which means that it is the best possible action under the circumstances” (239-240). A more permissive, goal-oriented account would not identify „fair” with „better,” but would allow an action to be considered correct, provided that „it is good enough, even if it is not (or a) the best action” (240). A minimalist, goal-focused account wouldn`t even need an action to be good, to be right. From such a point of view: „An action is only correct if it is not globally malicious” (240). (For a more in-depth discussion of goal-centered virtue ethics, see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016.) These aspects merge into the description of practical sages as those who understand what is really precious, really important and therefore really beneficial in life, who in short, know how to live well. Virtue ethics is currently one of the three main approaches to normative ethics. It can first be identified as one that emphasizes virtues or moral character, as opposed to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that a person in need should be helped. A utilitarian will emphasize that the consequences of this will maximize well-being, an ethics officer will emphasize that the agent does so in accordance with a moral rule such as „Do unto others what you would do,” and a virtue ethicist will emphasize that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent. (g) The objection to selfishness has several sources. One is a simple confusion.

Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent typically does what he should do without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that „she only does what she wants to do and is therefore selfish.” So, if the generous person likes to give, as the generous tend to do, it turns out that he is not generous and selfless after all, or at least not as generous as the one who eagerly wants to cling to everything he has, but forces himself to give because he thinks he should! A related version attributes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent and unjustifiably assumes that she acts as she does, believing that such an action on this occasion will help her achieve eudaimonia. But „the virtuous agent” is only „the agent with the virtues” and this is part of our ordinary understanding of the concepts of virtue, each of which comes with its own typical set of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone`s suffering will be avoided or that someone will benefit from it, or that the truth will be established, or that a debt will be repaid, or . thus. Originally, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. The blinkers of slogans that described virtue ethics as „preoccupied with being rather than doing it,” rather than asking „What kind of person should I be?” but not describing „What should I do?” as „agent-centered rather than action-centered,” their critics claimed that she was unable to give instructions for action, and therefore, rather than being a normative rival of utilitarian and deontological ethics, could claim to be nothing more than a valuable addition to them. The rather strange idea was that any virtue that ethics could offer was „to identify a moral example and do what he would do,” as if the raped fifteen-year-old who was trying to decide whether to abort or not had to ask himself, „Would Socrates have had an abortion if he had been in my situation?” Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To completely possess such a disposition is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways to miss this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). .

What Is Virtue Ethics in Business Ethics